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Abstract
This study examined whether or not exposing an eyewitness to a co-witness statement that
incorrectly blames an innocent bystander for a crime can increase the likelihood of the
eyewitness subsequently blaming the innocent bystander for the crime. It also examined
whether or not the perceived age of the co-witness influences this effect. Participant eyewit-
nesses first watched a video of a crime featuring a perpetrator and an innocent bystander.
They then read one of six bogus co-witness statements about the crime. All were presented
as having been written by a female co-witness and they differed in terms of her age (young
adult or elderly) and who she blamed for the crime (the perpetrator, the innocent bystander,
or nobody). One week later the participants were asked who committed the crime. When
the young adult co-witness had blamed the innocent bystander just over 40% of participants
subsequently did the same. Few participants (less than 8%) in the other conditions subse-
quently blamed the innocent bystander. The elderly co-witness was also rated as less
credible, less competent, and less accurate than the younger co-witness suggesting eyewit-
nesses were less likely to be influenced by her incorrect statement as they perceived her to
be a less reliable source of information. The applied implications of these findings are
discussed.
Introduction
There are hundreds of documented legal cases where innocent people have been accused,
tried, convicted, imprisoned, and sometimes executed, for crimes they did not commit [1–3].
Wrongful convictions can occur for a number of reasons including false confessions and
improper forensic analysis. In the United States, however, 76% of the first 250 people exoner-
ated of crimes as a result of DNA evidence were convicted, at least in part, as a result of mis-
taken eyewitness identification [4]. A large literature exists examining the reasons why
mistaken eyewitness identifications occur (for an overview see [5]). A small number of studies
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within this literature have demonstrated that eyewitnesses can sometimes mistakenly identify
an innocent bystander, visible during a crime but not directly involved in it, as the perpetrator
(e.g., [6]). This study examines whether or not eyewitnesses are at greater risk of blaming an
innocent bystander for a crime if they are exposed to post-event misinformation in a co-wit-
ness statement that suggests the innocent bystander was the perpetrator. This study also exam-
ines whether or not the age of the co-witness who wrote this statement impacts upon the effect.
Here, the co-witness was either a young adult or elderly.
Eyewitnesses can spontaneously mistakenly identify an innocent bystander as the perpetra-
tor of a crime (or other incident). This effect is known as unconscious transference [7–8].
Buckhout [6] demonstrated this in a study where 141 unsuspecting students witnessed a staged
assault on a professor by a stranger. Throughout the assault an innocent bystander was stood
nearby. Seven weeks later the students had to identify the perpetrator from a six person photo
lineup. One of the photographs was of the innocent bystander. Only 40% of the students cor-
rectly identified the perpetrator. A further 25% mistakenly identified the innocent bystander as
the perpetrator. Ross, Ceci, Dunning, and Toglia [9] suggest that unconscious transference can
occur for two reasons. In some instances eyewitnesses will have no conscious recollection of
seeing an innocent bystander during a crime but information about this person will have been
implicitly learned and stored in memory. When the eyewitnesses subsequently see the innocent
bystander in a lineup, this person feels familiar. As eyewitnesses would only expect a feeling of
familiarity upon seeing the perpetrator, the innocent bystander is assumed to be the perpetra-
tor. In other instances eyewitnesses will consciously recollect seeing the innocent bystander
and the perpetrator at the crime scene and create a separate memory for each. During a lineup,
however, the two memories become confused and the innocent bystander is identified as the
perpetrator.
It is established that if eyewitnesses encounter post-event misinformation that incorrectly
describes crime details then this same misinformation can taint the eyewitnesses’ subsequent
recollection of the crime (for reviews see [10–11]). One source of post-event misinformation is
leading questions which eyewitnesses can encounter when questioned about a crime by police
officers, lawyers, friends, or others [12]. A literature search suggests that only one study has
investigated whether or not leading questions implying an innocent bystander was to blame for
a crime can increase the likelihood of this person being mistakenly identified as the perpetrator.
In this study, Miller and Loftus [13] had participants read a story about an argument amongst
six students that culminated in an assault. Accompanying the story were pictures of each stu-
dent, one of whom was an innocent bystander wearing a hat. Immediately after the story half
of the participants were asked a leading question by the researcher that implied the person in
the hat had committed the assault. Three days later the participants were shown pictures of the
six students and had to identify the attacker. 24% of participants exposed to the leading ques-
tion mistakenly identified the innocent bystander in the hat as the attacker, compared to only
6% of participants not exposed to the leading question.
The above research shows three different ways in which an innocent bystander can be mis-
takenly identified as the perpetrator of a crime. At this juncture it is important point out two
key differences that exist between this earlier work and the current study. First, the current
study exposes participant eyewitnesses to post-event misinformation about who was to blame
for the crime via a co-witness statement (and not a leading question). Second, participants will
be questioned about who committed the crime (and will not complete a lineup). Both changes
are forensically relevant. The first change is forensically relevant as most crimes have multiple
eyewitnesses and information about the crime can be shared between these co-witnesses
throughout a criminal investigation [14–15]. This co-witness information can be shared
‘directly’ during discussions or ‘indirectly’ through a third party (e.g., a police officer) who
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informs one eyewitness about what another said [16]. There are several documented real world
cases where eyewitnesses have been exposed to co-witness misinformation and this same mis-
information has been incorporated into their subsequent legal testimonies (for examples see
[17–19]). When one individual alters their memory report of an event to be consistent with
another’s differing memory report of the same event this is known asmemory conformity [20]
or social contagion of memory [21]. It is therefore important to determine whether or not
exposing eyewitnesses to co-witness misinformation that suggests an innocent bystander was
the perpetrator of a crime can increase the risk of the eyewitnesses later blaming the innocent
bystander for the crime. The second change is forensically relevant as eyewitnesses are often
questioned by the police about a crime in the initial stages of an investigation. Some of these
questions will focus upon who the perpetrator was and a description will be taken. Lineups typ-
ically only take place after this initial questioning. It is therefore also important to determine
whether or not eyewitnesses who are exposed to co-witness misinformation that blames an
innocent bystander for a crime are at increased risk of subsequently blaming the innocent
bystander for the crime when their memory of it is assessed in this way.
A number of different techniques can be used to directly or indirectly expose participants to
co-witness misinformation during laboratory studies and induce memory conformity. A popu-
lar method of direct exposure involves having participant and confederate pairs study and
remember the same information together. During the collaborative remembering test the con-
federate deliberately claims to remember non-studied information. On subsequent individual
testing the participant often succumbs to memory conformity by also claiming to remember
the same non-studied information (e.g., [21–28]). A popular method of indirect exposure is to
have individual participants study some information, then have them read or listen to a hypo-
thetical co-participant’s erroneous recall of this same information, and then have them com-
plete an individual memory test. Again, participants often succumb to memory conformity
and claim to remember the non-studied information (e.g., [23–25; 29–32]).
It has yet to be determined whether or not exposing eyewitnesses to co-witness misinforma-
tion that blames an innocent bystander for a crime can increase the risk of the eyewitness sub-
sequently also blaming the innocent bystander for the crime. Thorley and Rushton-Woods
[33], however, provide evidence to suggest that attributions of blame for an incident can be
shifted between individuals as a result of indirectly encountered co-witness misinformation. In
their study, participant eyewitnesses watched a video of an accident involving two men, both of
whom were equally responsible for its occurrence. Participants then read one of three co-wit-
ness statements about the accident that differed in terms of who the co-witness blamed (Man
1, Man 2, or blame not mentioned). When no blame was mentioned in the statement less than
2% of participants subsequently attributed blame to one of the two men. When the co-witness
statement blamed one of the men for the accident 37% of participants also blamed this same
man. Thorley and Rushton-Woods referred to this specific type of memory conformity as
blame conformity to try and capture the fact that participants shifted their attributions of
blame to be consistent with those of a co-witness. Thorley and Rushton-Woods observations
cannot directly address the question as to whether or not co-witness post-event misinforma-
tion can lead to innocent bystanders being blamed for a crime. They do, however, demonstrate
that attributions of blame can be influenced by this form of post-event misinformation and
suggest such an effect may be possible.
The age of a co-witness (or co-participant) imparting post-event misinformation is an
important factor in determining whether or not a person succumbs to memory conformity.
This has been studied when the misinformation is encountered both directly and indirectly.
With respect to the former, Davis and Meade [34] demonstrated that young adult and elderly
participants will succumb to memory conformity when a confederate is a young adult but
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neither succumbs to memory conformity when a confederate is elderly. With respect to the lat-
ter, Kwong See, Hoffman, and Wood [35] found that young adults conformed to misinforma-
tion in a co-witness narrative when it supposedly derived from a young adult co-witness but
not an elderly co-witness. Kwong See et al. [35] also asked participants to rate the co-witness
on a range of dimensions including competence. Despite the fact that the narratives from both
co-witnesses were identical, the participants rated the elderly co-witness as less competent and
this rating predicted the degree to which they succumbed to memory conformity. Given these
findings it seems likely that a participant will be more likely to blame an innocent bystander for
a crime after being exposed to co-witness misinformation from a young adult, compared to an
elderly adult, that blames the innocent bystander for the crime.
The first aim of this study was to examine whether or not participant eyewitnesses will
engage in blame conformity with a co-witness who suggests that an innocent bystander was the
perpetrator of a crime. As in many previous studies on co-witness misinformation effects, this
misinformation will be delivered indirectly in the form a co-witness narrative (e.g., [35]). In
this narrative blame for the crime will be placed on the perpetrator, an innocent bystander, or
no blame will be mentioned. The second aim of this study was to examine whether or not dif-
ferences in the age of the co-witness who supposedly wrote the narrative impacts upon blame
conformity. This will be explored by informing participants that the co-witness was either a 21
year old or an 82 year old female. Based on past research demonstrating that eyewitnesses will
engage in memory conformity/blame conformity with a young adult co-witness, it was antici-
pated that participants who read an incorrect statement from a young adult co-witness will be
at greater risk of blaming the innocent bystander for the crime than those who read a correct
statement from this person or a statement in which she does not mention blame. Based on past
research demonstrating that eyewitnesses are less likely to engage in memory conformity with
an elderly co-witness, it was anticipated that participants who read an incorrect statement
from an elderly co-witness would be at no greater risk of blaming the innocent bystander for
the crime than those who read a correct statement from this person or a statement in which
she does not mention blame. Finally, participants will also be asked to rate the co-witness on
five characteristics (accuracy, confidence, honesty, credibility, and competence). Consistent
with past research by Kwong See et al. [35] it is anticipated that participants will rate the elderly
co-witness as less competent than the young adult co-witness.
Method
Participants
The sample consisted of 168 adults (111 females, 57 males) aged 18–70 (M = 21.45, SD = 7.32).
They were recruited via advertisements placed across the University of Liverpool. Participants
were a combination of staff and students. Participants received either course credit or a small
payment for participation. The study protocol was approved by the University of Liverpool
Institutional Research Ethics Committee and was conducted according to the ethical standards
laid down in the Declaration of Helsinki (1964). All participants gave informed signed consent
prior to taking part.
Design
The study had a 3 x 2 between-subjects design with 28 participants randomly allocated to each
of the six conditions. The first factor was co-witness statement type. This varied according to
whether the co-witness blamed no one for the crime, correctly blamed the perpetrator for
the crime, or incorrectly blamed an innocent bystander for the crime. The second factor was
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co-witness age, with her being either a young adult (21 years old) or elderly (82 years old). The
dependent measures are described next.
Stimuli and Dependent Measures
Six stimuli were used in this study: (i) a crime video, (ii) a filler video (iii) a picture of a co-wit-
ness who observed the crime, (iv) a statement from the co-witness about the crime, (v) a
10-item multiple choice recognition test about events in the crime video, and (vi) a 6-item
questionnaire about the co-witness.
The crime video centres on a young adult male selling a stolen camera in a pub to a young
adult female. It was professionally filmed for police training and lasts 1 min 11s. It begins with
the camera seller entering the pub. He approaches two different sets of customers who are sit-
ting at tables and asks them if they would like to buy a camera. On both occasions his offer is
turned down. In the critical scene the camera seller approaches a third table where three young
adults in their early twenties are sitting together having a drink. The group consists of one male
with short brown hair who is wearing a light brown coloured shirt, one female with short
(above the shoulder) dark brown hair who is wearing a white fleece with a zip-up collar, and
one female with long (past the shoulder) light brown hair who is wearing a grey jumper. The
two females are therefore easily distinguishable in terms of their hair colour, hair length, style
of clothing, and colour of clothing. The camera seller asks the group if they would be interested
in buying a camera and the female with the short dark brown hair and white fleece expresses
an interest. The camera seller sits at the table, passes her the camera under the table to look at,
they agree on a price for the camera, and she passes him the money under the table. The cam-
era seller then leaves the group and the video ends. Throughout the video only a small section
of the pub is shown and background noise suggests that other people are in the venue at the
time of the incident but that they are out of camera shot. The crime video depicts two criminal
offences under local English and Welsh law [36]. First, it is illegal to sell stolen property. Sec-
ond, it is illegal to purchase stolen property. In this study, it is the latter crime that is the focus
of attention, with participants’ attributions of blame with regards to who purchased the stolen
camera being assessed.
The filler video was used to create a short break between participants watching the crime
video and reading the co-witness statement. The video was an excerpt from a television docu-
mentary series about the British coastline and lasted 5 min. It was selected as the content
does not in any way overlap with that of the critical incident video, meaning it should not
provide any post-event information that could contaminate participants’ memory of the crit-
ical incident.
Prior to reading the co-witness statement about the crime, participants were presented with
a picture of the co-witness. The picture was either of a 21 year old female or an 82 year old
female. Similar photographs were used by Kwong See et al. [35] and these were introduced to
emphasise the co-witness’s age. These pictures were selected from a pre-existing database of
adult faces designed for research purposes [37]. Both pictures were black and white, had for-
ward-facing profiles showing the women’s head and neck only, and were matched in terms of
their perceived familiarity of appearance, mood expressed, picture memorability, and image
quality. Both pictures were accompanied by the same fictional co-witness name (Elizabeth
Smith) and her age.
There were six versions of the co-witness statement. Each was written from the perspective
of the female co-witness. Each statement was identical aside from two features. Depending
upon the co-witness age condition, she claimed to be in the pub with either her grandmother
or granddaughter. This was done to reinforce the fact that she was a young adult or elderly.
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There were three versions of each young adult and elderly co-witness statement that varied
with respect to who was blamed for purchasing the stolen camera. One-third were control
statements where no blame was attributed. In these the co-witness simply said that “one of the
ladies” purchased the camera. One-third were correct statements with the co-witness correctly
stating that “the lady with the short dark brown hair and white top” bought the camera. The
remaining third were incorrect statements where the co-witness incorrectly stated that “the
lady with the long light brown hair and a grey top” bought the camera. All other details in the
six co-witness statements were correct. The control statements were included as they provide a
measure of how accurately participants remembered who was to blame for the crime. If only
the correct and incorrect statements were used and participants blamed the same person as the
co-witness in these conditions then it would not be possible to determine whether participants
were correct in the correct statement conditions as they remembered the incident correctly or
because they were engaging in blame conformity.
The 10-item multiple choice questionnaire contained nine general questions regarding the
crime video and one critical question regarding who was to blame. The questions were pre-
sented one at a time on a PowerPoint display with a choice of four possible answers beneath
them. One answer was always ‘don’t know’ as real eyewitnesses can withhold answers to ques-
tions during police interviews if they are unsure of an answer [38] and this option has been
demonstrated to increase their overall accuracy [39–42]. The nine general questions related to
different aspects of the video such as the gender of the first group of customers the camera
seller approached. None of these questions related to the three individuals who the camera
seller approached last. These nine general questions were included to disguise the fact that the
study was primarily interested in attributions of blame for the crime. Preliminary analysis of
the answers to these nine questions revealed no significant difference in the recall performance
of participants in each of the 6 conditions or between those participants who blamed the inno-
cent bystander for the crime after reading an incorrect statement and those who did not (all
p’s>.05). Consequently, these findings are not discussed any further. For those who are inter-
ested, the full anonymised data set from this study is available on the Open Science Framework
website (see the following direct link: https://osf.io/ex8p7/?view_only=
166afc2821564d37a4341e0dd0340b92). The critical question always appeared 7th and asked
‘Who bought the camera?’. The four possible answers were (a) The man with the short brown
hair and light brown shirt, (b) The woman with the long light brown hair and grey top, (c) The
woman with the short dark brown hair and white top, and (d) don’t know.
The 6-item questionnaire about the co-witness contained a single age manipulation check
question and five questions asking participants about their perceptions of the co-witness based
on her statement. The age manipulation check question asked participants “How old was the
eyewitness?” with participants also told “If you cannot remember her exact age, please provide
your best guess". This was included as the study is examining the impact of co-witness age on
blame conformity and it is important to establish that participants had noted the co-witness’
age before any claims can be made with regards to how this age impacted upon their perfor-
mance. The remaining five questions were taken from Brimacombe, Jung, Garrioch, and Alli-
son [43] and required participants to rate their co-witness in terms of how accurate, confident,
honest, credible, and competent she seemed. All ratings were made using 7-point Likert scales
(1 = not at all; 7 = extremely).
Procedure
Testing occurred in two sessions that were one week apart. In both sessions the participants
were tested within single-person partitioned computer booths that had headphones attached to
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the computers. All stimuli were presented as part of a PowerPoint presentation. In Session 1,
onscreen instructions informed the participants that they would be required to watch two
short videos and read some information about one of the videos. The onscreen instructions
then asked participants to place their headphones on so that they could hear the audio in the
videos and the study commenced. The crime video was presented first. When the crime video
finished there was a 5s pause. During this pause there was a warning that the second (filler)
video was about to start. After the filler video, onscreen instructions informed participants that
they would be shown some information about a co-witness who was in the pub in the first
video when the stolen camera was purchased and that they would have 10s to read over this
information. The presentation then moved on to reveal a picture of the co-witness, her name,
and her age. Participants were then shown a slide containing the co-witness statement and
informed they had 2 min to read over it. After the 2 min were over, the slide disappeared. After
this, Session 1 ended and participants were asked to return to the laboratory one week later.
The decision was made to introduce the co-witness misinformation in Session 1 as surveys sug-
gest most crimes have multiple eyewitnesses and co-witness misinformation can be shared
between these co-witnesses prior to them being questioned by the police. The introduction of a
one-week delay between sessions is forensically relevant given that there can then be an indefi-
nite time period between an eyewitness observing an incident and recalling it for legal testi-
mony [44].
Session 2 started with onscreen instructions informing participants that they would be
required to complete a memory test relating to the first video they saw the previous week. The
first of the 10-item multiple choice questions then appeared. Onscreen instructions informed
participants that they could navigate through the 10 questions at their own pace using the
downward arrow key on the keyboard and that they must select a single answer. Their answers
were to be written on a response sheet that was provided by stating whether they were choosing
answer a, b, c, or d. After this, participants were asked to answer six questions about the co-wit-
ness, again navigating through the questions at their own pace using the keyboard and writing
their answers on a new response sheet. After this, participants were debriefed, thanked for their
time, and asked to refrain from disclosing the aims of the study to other potential participants.
The participants were also asked if they were aware of the true aims of the study (in an effort to
capture any demand characteristics) and none claimed awareness.
Results
Age Manipulation Check
As the study is examining the impact of co-witness age upon blame conformity it is important
to establish that participants attended to the co-witness’s age during testing. This was assessed
by asking participants to recall her age at the end of the study. Participants were not expected
to remember her exact age due to the one week interval between learning it and recalling it.
The responses of those in the young adult co-witness condition ranged from 17–32 years of age
(Mean = 22.94,Median = 22.00, SD = 3.41) and the responses of those in the elderly co-witness
condition ranged from 61–93 years of age (Mean = 78.18,Median = 81.00, SD = 7.24). Partici-
pants were, therefore, fairly precise in their responses. This difference was significant, t(166) =
55.24, p< .001, d = 9.76, confirming the age manipulation was successful.
Blame Conformity Analysis
Two separate 4 x 3 Exact Pearson Chi-Square tests were used to determine if there was an asso-
ciation between who participants blamed for the crime (the innocent man, the innocent
woman, the guilty woman, or don’t know) and who the co-witness blamed for the crime
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(control statement with no blame, correct statement blaming the guilty woman, or incorrect
statement blaming the innocent woman). The first test examined participants’ attributions of
blame after reading the young adult co-witness statement whereas the second test examined
participants’ attributions of blame after reading the elderly co-witness statement. Exact Chi-
Square Tests were used as data screening revealed that several contingency table cells had
expected counts of less than 5 (for readers unfamiliar with Exact Tests, see [45]). The full range
of observed frequencies, in percentages, can be seen in Table 1.
After reading the control statement from the young adult co-witness, 7.10% of participants
blamed the innocent woman for the crime whereas 75.00% blamed the guilty woman. An iden-
tical trend was observed after participants had read the correct statement from the young adult
co-witness. Participants were therefore largely correct in their attributions of blame in these
conditions with only a small proportion blaming the man or choosing ‘don’t know’. In con-
trast, when participants read the incorrect young adult co-witness statement 42.90% blamed
the innocent woman whereas 35.70% blamed the guilty woman. This latter result suggests
blame conformity occurred. Again, few people blamed the innocent man or selected ‘don’t
know’. There was a significant association between who the young adult co-witness blamed for
the crime and who participants blamed, χ2 (6, n = 84) = 18.96, exact p = .003, Cramer’s V = .34.
The standardised residuals were examined to determine which cells contained frequencies that
differed from those expected if there was no association between who the co-witness blamed
and who the participants blamed. To be statistically significant at the .05 level, the standardised
residuals need to be +/- 1.96 z-scores. After reading an incorrect young adult co-witness state-
ment blaming the innocent woman for the crime the participants blamed the innocent woman
more often than expected (z = 2.90). No other cells contained values that significantly differed
from the expected frequencies (all z’s =<1.96). Combined, these results demonstrate that par-
ticipants engaged in blame conformity with the incorrect young adult co-witness.
After reading the control statement from the elderly co-witness 7.10% of participants
blamed the innocent woman and 82.10% blamed the guilty woman. A similar trend was
observed after participants read the correct elderly co-witness statement with 3.60% blaming
the innocent woman and 92.90% blaming the guilty woman. No participants in either condi-
tion blamed the innocent man and a small percentage selected ‘don’t know’. Crucially, when
participants read the incorrect elderly co-witness statement only 7.10% blamed the innocent
woman and 75.00% blamed the guilty woman. Again, only a small number of participants
blame the man or responded ‘don’t know’. Combined, these results suggest participants were
generally correct in their attributions of blame for the crime and that those who read an incor-
rect elderly co-witness statement did not succumb to blame conformity. In support of this
there was no significant association between who the elderly co-witness blamed and who the
participants blamed, χ2 (6, n = 84) = 6.09, exact p = .46, Cramer’s V = .19.
Co-Witness Questionnaire Analysis
The final analysis examined whether or not there was a difference in how participants per-
ceived the young adult and elderly co-witnesses in terms of their accuracy, confidence, honesty,
credibility, and competence. The means and standard deviations for each trait can be seen in
Table 2. Participants perceived the young adult and elderly co-witness to be equally confident,
t(166) = 1.39, p = .17, d = .21, and equally honest, t(166) = .56, p = .57, d = .08. In contrast, the
elderly co-witness was rated as lower than the younger co-witness in terms of accuracy, t(166)
= 2.96, p< .01, d = .46, credibility, t(166) = 6.41, p< .01, d = .98, and competence, t(166) =
7.26, p< .01, d = 1.12.
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Discussion
This study examined whether or not exposing eyewitnesses to a co-witness statement that
incorrectly suggests an innocent bystander was the perpetrator of a crime can increase the like-
lihood of these eyewitnesses subsequently blaming the innocent bystander for the crime. It also
examined whether or not the perceived age of the co-witness who wrote this statement influ-
ences this effect. To assess this, participant eyewitnesses watched a video of a crime featuring a
perpetrator and an innocent bystander. They then read a statement from a young adult or
elderly female co-witness that blamed nobody for the crime, correctly blamed the perpetrator
for the crime, or incorrectly blamed the innocent bystander for the crime. When subsequently
asked who committed the crime, just over 40% of participants who read the young adult co-
witness’s incorrect statement also blamed the innocent bystander. Less than 8% of participants
who read the elderly co-witness’s incorrect statement blamed the innocent bystander. Similarly,
less than 8% of participants in each of the remaining four conditions blamed the innocent
bystander. Exposing an eyewitness to post-event misinformation from a young adult, but not
elderly, co-witness who incorrectly blames an innocent bystander for a crime can therefore
increase the likelihood of the eyewitness subsequently blaming the innocent bystander for the
crime. When asked to rate their co-witness on a number of traits, participants rated the elderly
co-witness as less accurate, less competent, and less credible. This occurred despite her state-
ment being identical to that of the young adult co-witness. This suggests that eyewitnesses are
less likely to be influenced by an elderly co-witness’s incorrect statement as they perceived her
to be a less reliable source of information.
This study extends our understanding of the conditions under which innocent bystanders
can be blamed for a crime. It had previously been demonstrated that if eyewitnesses are
Table 1. Percentage of trials on which participants attributed blame for a crime to the innocent man, innocent woman, guilty woman, or responded
don’t know after reading a co-witness statement where a young adult or elderly co-witness blamed either nobody (control statements), the inno-
cent woman (incorrect statements), or the guilty woman (correct statements). The percentages shown are within-statement type.
Statement Type Participant Blame
Co-witness Age Innocent Man Innocent Woman Guilty Woman Don’t Know
Young Adult Control Statement 10.70 7.10 75.00 7.10
Correct Statement 3.60 7.10 75.00 14.30
Incorrect Statement 10.70 42.90 35.70 10.70
Elderly Adult Control Statement 0.00 7.10 82.10 10.70
Correct Statement 0.00 3.60 92.90 3.60
Incorrect Statement 7.10 7.10 75.00 10.70
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0134739.t001
Table 2. Participants’ perceptions of the young adult and elderly co-witness’s accuracy, confidence,
honesty, credibility, and competence. Each trait was scored on a scale of 1–7 (1 = not at all;
7 = extremely).
Co-Witness Trait Co-Witness Age
Young Adult Elderly Adult
Accuracy 5.75 (.96) 5.27 (1.12)
Confidence 5.68 (1.02) 5.89 (0.98)
Honesty 5.86 (0.79) 5.94 (1.09)
Credibility 5.65 (0.96) 4.55 (1.25)
Competence 5.86 (0.96) 4.57 (1.31)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0134739.t002
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exposed to a crime involving a perpetrator and an innocent bystander and then administered
with a lineup in which both individuals appear then they can engage in unconscious transfer-
ence whereby they spontaneously mistakenly identify the innocent bystander as the perpetrator
[6]. It had also been demonstrated that eyewitnesses are at greater risk of committing such an
error if, prior to completing the lineup, they encounter post-event misinformation in a leading
question that suggests the innocent bystander was the perpetrator [13]. The current study dif-
fered from this earlier work in several ways but two key differences were that participant eye-
witnesses were exposed to post-event misinformation via a co-witness statement that was
supposedly written by a young adult or elderly adult (and not a leading question) and partici-
pants were asked who committed the crime (instead of completing a lineup). This is the first
study to demonstrate that participant eyewitnesses are at increased risk of blaming an innocent
bystander for a crime after exposure to post-event misinformation from a young adult, but
not elderly, co-witness and that this can occur when memory of the perpetrator is assessed in
this way.
Prior to this study it was known that if an eyewitness is exposed to a young adult co-wit-
ness’s incorrect description of an event, whether directly during a co-witness discussion or
indirectly through a third party, then the eyewitness can succumb to memory conformity and
incorporate this misinformation into their own descriptions of the event [21–32, 34, 35, 46]. It
was unknown whether or not exposure to post-event misinformation from a young adult co-
witness who incorrectly blames an innocent bystander for a crime could increase the likelihood
of eyewitnesses also blaming the innocent bystander for the crime. There was, however, evi-
dence to suggest this may be possible. Thorley and Rushton-Woods [33] presented participants
with a video of an accident involving two men, both of whom were equally responsible for its
occurrence, and then had their participants read a co-witness statement written by a young
female that incorrectly blamed one of the two men for the accident. When subsequently asked
who was responsible for the accident nearly 40% of eyewitnesses exposed to the incorrect state-
ment also blamed the same man. Thorley and Rushton-Woods referred to this more specific
form of memory conformity as blame conformity. Despite this finding, it is reasonable to spec-
ulate that eyewitnesses may be more inclined to engage in blame conformity when the to-be-
remembered event is an accident involving two people who are both equally responsible for it,
compared to when it is a crime where one single identifiable person was responsible. Eyewit-
nesses did, however, also engage in blame conformity with a young adult co-witness who incor-
rectly blamed an innocent bystander for a crime. This study therefore demonstrates a novel
way in which co-witness misinformation can lead to inaccurate eyewitness testimony.
Prior to this study it was also known that individuals are less likely to succumb to memory
conformity when misinformation derives from elderly person than a young adult [34–35]. It
was, however, unknown whether or not a similar pattern of results would be observed in rela-
tion to blame conformity. Given that blame conformity is a more specific form of memory con-
formity it seemed likely this would occur. As anticipated, a similar pattern of results was
observed. Indeed, there was no evidence of blame conformity at all after participants read the
elderly adult co-witness’s incorrect statement as the number of participants who blamed the
innocent bystander in this condition was equivalent to the number of participants who did so
after reading her correct statement or the statement in which she blamed no one for the crime.
Kwong See et al. [35] found that participants are less likely to succumb to memory confor-
mity when presented with misinformation deriving from an elderly co-witness than a young
adult co-witness as they perceive the elderly co-witness to be less competent. Whilst this was
also observed here, it was also found that participants rated the elderly participant as less credi-
ble and less accurate than the younger co-witness despite their eyewitness statements being
similar. These findings are consistent with the stereotypical belief that aging is accompanied by
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a decline in memory [47–48]. Ross, Dunning, Toglia, and Ceci [49] demonstrated that such
beliefs can influence perceptions of eyewitnesses with undergraduate participants in their study
indicating that they expected a 74 year old eyewitness to have a less accurate memory than a 21
year old eyewitness. Indeed, 34% of their sample believed that it was possible for a person to
become too old to be a competent witness.
Wright et al. [17] suggest that individuals can succumb to memory conformity for one of
three reasons. First, they may succumb as a result of normative influence whereby they know-
ingly report errant information suggested by others in order to be liked and accepted by them.
Second, they may succumb as a result of informational influence whereby they are uncertain of
the truth and consequently report the suggested errant information out of a desire to be correct.
Third, they may succumb as they have formed an episodic memory of the errant information.
Individual participants within the same study may succumb to memory conformity for differ-
ent reasons (e.g., [50]). It is beyond the scope of this study to determine why individual partici-
pants succumbed but it seems unlikely they did so as a result of normative influence as they did
not work alongside a real co-witness who they could be liked and accepted by. Instead, the
overall pattern of results suggests the blame conformity in this study was driven informational
influence. This explanation is favoured as participants were more likely to succumb to blame
conformity when the source of the misinformation was perceived as competent, credible, and
accurate. It is speculated that participants who read an incorrect statement about who was to
blame had doubt put in their minds with regards to the truth. Those who read the inaccurate
statement from the young adult co-witness may have felt inclined to believe this source but
those in the elderly co-witness condition may have felt the source was unreliable and relied
upon their own accurate memory of the crime instead. It is, however, not possible to rule out
that some participants who engaged in blame conformity may have generated false memories
of the crime and genuinely believed the innocent bystander was the perpetrator.
An alternative explanation for the age effects observed in this study is that the specific pic-
tures used of the young adult and elderly co-witness influenced participant’s attributions of
blame. The pictures were matched on a range of qualities including their perceived familiarity
of appearance, mood expressed, picture memorability, and image quality (see [37]). It may
be the case, however, that the younger adult in the photograph looked like a more ‘credible’,
‘competent’, or ‘accurate’ person irrespective of her age and participants were more likely to
engage in blame conformity with her for this reason. This alternative explanation cannot be
completely ruled out but it does seem unlikely. The findings from this study are consistent with
those of previous studies that also used photographs of a young adult or elderly co-witness [35]
or had participants work with a real young adult or elderly co-participant [34]. Co-witness age
differences in memory conformity therefore seem to be robust and not an artefact of the physi-
cal appearance of the specific people used as the young adult and elderly co-witnesses/co-
participants.
These findings from this study have applied relevance. Most crimes have multiple eyewit-
nesses [14–15] and post-event misinformation deriving from one co-witness can contaminate
the legal testimony of another (for examples see [17–19]). If an eyewitness is exposed to post-
event co-witness misinformation suggesting an innocent bystander was the perpetrator of a
crime then this eyewitness could subsequently report that this innocent person was to blame
when questioned by the police. This could then waste police resources in several ways. If the
innocent bystander was no longer present at the crime scene then the police would have to
devote resources to searching for this individual. If the innocent bystander was later found
then the police could waste time asking the innocent bystander irrelevant questions about his
or her role in the crime. If the innocent bystander was subsequently charged with the crime
then this could lead to a miscarriage of justice. Following concerns over the negative impact
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that exposure to co-witness misinformation can have on the reliability of eyewitness testimony,
countries such as the United States [51, 52] and the United Kingdom [53] have created guide-
lines recommending that police officers keep co-witnesses separate and that they establish
whether or not they have spoken to each other in order to determine whether their testimonies
can be classed as truly independent evidence or not. The findings from the present study
emphasise the importance of this.
One limitation to the ecological validity of the current findings is the way in which memory of
the perpetrator was assessed. Here, participants answered a multiple choice recognition test ques-
tion that asked them who committed the crime and the response options were the female perpe-
trator, a male innocent bystander, a female innocent bystander, or ‘don’t know’. This was done to
ensure all participants were questioned about the perpetrator’s identity in a similar way. In real
police interviews eyewitnesses are unlikely to be given multiple choice questions about a crime.
Instead, police interviewers in many countries (e.g., the United States, see [51, 52]; the United
Kingdom, see [54]) are encouraged to assess eyewitness memory of an incident via free recall
before asking open-ended cued-recall questions. As discussed by Koriat and Goldsmith (see [40–
41]), free recall produces largely accurate recollection as it requires self-guided retrieval, meaning
that eyewitnesses typically only report information they are confident about. In contrast, multiple
choice tests utilise externally-guided retrieval where the interviewer dictates what information is
important and thus what information the eyewitness reports. This leads individuals to report
information which they may not necessarily choose to report because they are unsure of it and
can result in increased errors and confabulations. It is therefore possible that the use of a multiple
choice question in the current study to assess memory of who committed the crime, when one
option was the innocent bystander, inflated blame conformity effects in the incorrect statement
condition. To control for this the current study allowed participants to respond ‘don’t know’ to
all questions. This is forensically important as real eyewitnesses can withhold answers to ques-
tions during interviews if they are unsure of an answer [38]. It is also methodologically important
as providing this option during multiple choice memory tests has been found to increase eyewit-
ness memory accuracy (e.g., [39–42]). Thus, whilst the ecological validity of this study may have
been lowered by the use of a multiple choice question to assess memory of the perpetrator it is
unlikely that the use of this question increased susceptibility to blame conformity.
There is an important outstanding issue that requires consideration in future research. It is
possible that degree of similarity between an innocent bystander and a perpetrator may influ-
ence the degree to which eyewitnesses engage in blame conformity. Research from the uncon-
scious transference literature suggests that eyewitnesses are more likely to spontaneously blame
an innocent bystander for a crime if they are similar in appearance to the perpetrator [55]. In
the present study (and in [33]) blame for an incident was shifted between two individuals who
were similar in terms of their gender, race, and age. It may have been the case that these ethno-
graphic similarities facilitated blame conformity in this study as participants felt they may have
simply misremembered which young white female committed the crime. The perpetrator and
innocent bystander did differ in several ways (e.g., hair colour, hair length, colour of clothing).
Several other salient differences, such as their gender or race, could have also existed between
them. It would be of interest to determine whether or not blame conformity still occurs when
such salient differences do exist.
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